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This paper is a survey of the literature on theoretical models of the household, paying 
particular attention to some of the earlier contributions, and using them to place the current 
state of the theory in perspective. One of its aims is to suggest that the literature’s neglect of 
Samuelson’s proposal, that households can be modelled as if they maximised a form of social 
welfare function, was a mistake. However, the idea following directly from the Nash 
bargaining models, that the household’s preference ordering over the utility profiles of its 
members depends on exogenous variables, in particular wage rates and non-wage incomes, is 
an important one. Combined with Samuelson’s proposal, it can be made the basis for a 
general approach to modelling household decision taking, flexible enough to encompass non-
cooperative behaviour and Pareto inefficiencies arising out of the inevitable incompleteness 
and unenforceability of domestic agreements. We also point out the importance of household 
production and some of the implications of its neglect in modelling households. Above all, the 
aim is to provide a deeper understanding of the current theoretical literature on household 
economics by means of a survey of its history. 
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December 11, 2007 1 Introduction
This paper is a survey of the literature on theoretical models1 of the household,
paying particular attention to some of the earlier contributions, and using them
to place the current state of the theory in perspective. The ￿rst and most basic
distinction we make is that between models which analyse the decisions of a
single consumer/worker, and those that begin with the view of a household as
consisting of more than one individual. We reserve the term ￿household models￿
for the latter, and call the former ￿individual models￿ . We de￿ne a household
as a set of two or more individuals who live together and are involved in joint
(pairwise or group) decision taking in respect of their allocations of time and
money. Models of the household in this sense, also commonly called ￿family
models￿ ,2 are the subject of this paper.
A second distinction concerns the purpose the models are meant to serve.
Here we can contrast the approaches of the two early pioneers in this ￿eld, Paul
A. Samuelson and Gary S. Becker. We would phrase the question motivating
Samuelson￿ s approach in general terms as:
What becomes of the standard propositions of economics, whether
theoretical or empirical, positive or normative, when we realise that
the basic decision taking unit is a household and not an individual?
In his classic paper on social indi⁄erence curves,3 Samuelson noted that his
proof that these indi⁄erence curves could not exist, in the sense that they consti-
tute a preference map with the same properties as that in the individual model,
presented major problems for the theory of consumer demand, since observed
household demands must in general be aggregates of demands of the individuals
in the household. Then, how can a household be modelled in such a way that its
preference ordering possesses the properties of those in the individual model?
The answers given by Samuelson and others to the general questions raised by
the nature of household decision taking is the main theme of this paper.
Becker￿ s approach, on the other hand, was concerned not with reformulating
the existing body of economic propositions, but with extending the domain of
economic analysis to areas that before him had not generally been considered
amenable to or appropriate for it. He was concerned to show that economic
methodology could give important new insights into the workings of the house-
hold as an economic institution, in matters such as marriage, divorce, fertility,
bequests, human capital formation, role allocation, and so on. Here, we will not
review this important body of literature,4 but simply note that his results were
1A companion paper to this, Apps and Rees (2007a), surveys the empirical literature.
2A problem with this terminology is that without further quali￿cation, for example by
terms such as ￿nuclear￿or ￿extended￿, it is hard to decide if a ￿family￿meets this de￿nition
of a household or not, while a household in the sense de￿ned here may not be a family. See
also Pollak (1985).
3Samuelson (1956).
4For an extensive survey and discussion of Becker￿ s work in general see Pollak (2003).
Bergstrom (1997) also gives a wide-ranging survey of the broad ￿eld of household economics.
2mainly achieved in the context of a model that adopted the simplest possible so-
lution to Samuelson￿ s problem, by assuming that the household￿ s preferences are
those of an individual, the "head of the household". This is a much more drastic
and simplistic step than that proposed by Samuelson himself, even though in
the later literature the two are often, quite incorrectly, lumped together.
A third distinction we make in this introduction is that between models that
do and those that do not incorporate household production, the use of market
goods and household members￿time to produce goods and services for con-
sumption within the household. It is perfectly possible to introduce household
production into the individual consumer model, as was done by Becker (1965),
Gorman (1956), Lancaster (1966), Muth (1966) and others, and a lot can be
learned from this.5 It is also possible to formulate household models without
household production, where, as in the individual model, each worker/consumer
divides her time between just two uses, market labour supply and ￿leisure￿ , the
direct consumption of one￿ s own time. Throughout his discussion Samuelson,
in order ￿ to eliminate nonessential complications￿ , assumes a two-person pure
exchange economy, so that his household consists of individuals with given en-
dowments of consumption goods.6 Whatever the formal di¢ culties, it seems
to us to be essential to either of the basic purposes of household models - the
reformulation of the standard results of economics, and the extension of its do-
main of application - to incorporate household production. We will make this
argument in detail at various points in the rest of this paper.
We organise this overview of the theoretical literature on household models
by classifying them into three types, acording to the principle by which the
resource allocation decisions of the household are assumed to be solved. We dis-
tinguish between cooperative models, non-cooperative models, and equilibrium
models.
Under the ￿rst heading we group Samuelson (1956), Becker (1981), the bar-
gaining models of Chen and Woolley (2001), Lundberg and Pollak (1993), McEl-
roy and Horney (1981), Manser and Brown (1980), and Ott (1992), as well as the
non-bargaining models of Apps and Rees (1988), (1997), (2001), Basu (2006),
Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori (1988), (1992)7, and regard them
Jacob Mincer was of course also an in￿uential early contributor to the ￿eld, see for example
Mincer (1963).
5These models should be distinguished from the models of household farm production that
are found in the development economics literature, see for example Singh et. al. (1986).
The key di⁄erence is that in this literature the goods produced in the household have perfect
substitutes in the market. The basic model is that of a small open economy determining its
production equilibrium by equating domestic marginal costs with world prices, and exporting
or importing the di⁄erence between its production and consumption. We would argue that
in this case household production, in the sense de￿ned in this paper, becomes uninteresting.
We are interested only in household goods that are consumed within the household and that
have imperfect, even if close, substitutes on the market.
6He obviously saw it as unproblematic to extend the model to include production. If there
are joint costs and increasing returns to scale, the analysis does become more complicated,
and some authors have seen these as central aspects of household production. See in particular
the critique of Becker￿ s household production model by Pollak and Wachter (1975).
7Vermeulen (2002) surveys the theoretical and empirical work on the model presented in
3as particular formulations of Samuelson￿ s consensual approach. We will try to
distinguish the contribution each type of model makes to the development of this
approach (regardless of whether or not the authors concerned saw themselves
as in fact working in the Samuelson tradition).
Non-cooperative models, such as those of Leuthold (1968), Ashworth and
Ulph (1981), and Konrad and Lommerud (1995), (2000), characterise the house-
hold allocation as the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. In the liter-
ature we often ￿nd the assertion that a key di⁄erence between cooperative and
non-cooperative models is that the equilibrium allocations in non-cooperative
models are not assumed to be Pareto e¢ cient, while those in cooperative models
are assumed to be. This could however be misleading.
To see this, it is useful to recall the distinction between the Pareto prop-
erty of social welfare functions and the ￿rst or second best Pareto e¢ ciency of
equilibrium resource allocations. The cooperative models all have, explicitly or
implicitly, maximands that we will call household welfare functions, and these
all have the Pareto property - an increase in the utility of any one individual,
ceteris paribus, is always a good thing. Non-cooperative models do not possess
maximands in this sense, i.e. they are not based on the idea that the household
as a group solves a well-de￿ned maximisation problem, even though the indi-
viduals within it maximise their own utilities. Nevertheless, models adopting
the cooperative approach need not result in ￿rst best Pareto e¢ cient equilibria,
while non-cooperative models can result in ￿rst best Pareto e¢ cient outcomes.
The e¢ ciency of the realised resource allocation depends on the constraints that
are imposed on the allocations that are feasible, i.e. on the entire structure of
the model.
For example, in a two-period Nash bargaining model the inability to make
binding commitments between periods may lead to second best outcomes,8 even
though the Nash bargaining model assumes the Pareto property in the function
to be maximised. On the other hand, in an in￿nitely repeated non-cooperative
game, ￿rst best Pareto e¢ cient allocations are often in the set of subgame perfect
Nash equilibria. In other words, it is neither necessary nor su¢ cient that a model
be cooperative for it to produce ￿rst best Pareto e¢ cient allocations, and so it
is a source of confusion to de￿ne the di⁄erences between these classes of model
in terms of the Pareto e¢ ciency of their outcomes. It should also be noted that
some of the cooperative models use aspects of the results of the non-cooperative
models, for example in de￿ning threat points in the cooperative Nash bargaining
game, or in drawing on the results for private-contribution public goods games.9
We discuss these issues further in sections 2, 3 and especially 4 below.
Finally, we have models such as the Walrasian exchange model of Apps
(1981), (1982), the marriage market models of Becker (1973) (1974), and the
marriage labour market model of Grossbard (1976), (1984), (2003). Here, un-
like both cooperative and non-cooperative models, the household members do
not act as if they were in a situation of strategic interdependence, but simply
these papers by Chiappori and Browning and Chiappori, referred to as the collective model.
8See for example Ott (1992) and Lundberg and Pollak (2003).
9See Warr (1983) and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1987) for the theory of these games.
4take individually optimal decisions subject to the constraints presented by com-
petitive markets. Then, while household members do not behave cooperatively
in the decision making sense, competitive market forces determine equilibrium
solutions to their resource allocation problems that are typically Pareto e¢ -
cient (though possibly very unequal). An important insight that these models
provide, in common with the bargaining models, is that conditions on markets
external to the household have an important in￿ uence on the equilibrium alloca-
tion of resources within it. In this paper we brie￿ y discuss the Apps model, but,
for reasons of space constraints, leave it to the reader to pursue the important
contributions of Becker and Grossbard.
2 Cooperative Models
The common element of the models reviewed in this section is that the objec-
tive functions they postulate for the household, used to solve the household￿ s
resource allocation problem, are based on Samuelson￿ s idea of a consensual or
cooperative household agreement. The models di⁄er in the attention they pay
to the question of how the household reaches this agreement, and the e⁄ect this
has on the form of its objective function. Furthermore, they assume that the
household members pool their incomes in deriving the household budget con-
straint, in the sense that it is feasible to make any lump sum income transfers
between individuals that may be required to reach the household optimum. This
does not mean that all the models imply the so-called ￿Pooling Hypothesis￿ ,
which suggests the inappropriateness of this terminology and the need for an
alternative.
2.1 Samuelson￿ s theorem
To solve the problem of how to derive transitive household preference orderings
that allow derivation of well-behaved household demand functions for goods,
Samuelson proposed the application of the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function (SWF), which in this context we will call the household welfare function
(HWF). If we denote the utility functions of the h household members by ui(xi);
i = 1;::h; with xi 2 Rn
+ their consumption vectors, we can de￿ne the HWF as H(
u1(x1);:::; uh(xh)). Note that the individual utility functions are "sel￿sh", in the
sense that they represent the individual preference orderings over consumption
bundles.10 Aspects of household relationships such as love and caring can best
be thought of as entering into the determination of the HWF.
To understand what is implied by the translation of this concept from general
equilibrium welfare economics to the analysis of the household, it is useful to
spend a little more time on the meaning of the SWF than Samuelson did in his
paper.11 The central idea is to abstract from the issue of exactly how the social
10Though of course they maybe extended to incorporate whatever externalities and public
goods may be present within the household.
11For fuller discussion of the concept, in the context that preoccupied theoretical and applied
5group, in this case the household, arrives at its complete, transitive preference
ordering over levels of well-being of its members, as well as leaving open the
choice of a speci￿c function to represent this preference ordering. Whatever
this process may be, it is assumed that the outcome can be represented as a
function possessing a minimum of three basic properties:
￿ the Pareto property: @H=@ui ￿ Hi > 0; it is strictly increasing in the
well-being of each individual;
￿ quasi-concavity: given two utility pro￿les [ui(:)]h
i=1 and [^ ui(:)]h
i=1 such
that H( u1(:);:::; uh(:)) ￿ H( ^ u1(:);:::; ^ uh(:)); and a third utility pro￿le
[￿ ui(:)]h
i=1 = ￿[ui(:)]h
i=1 + (1 ￿ ￿)[^ ui(:)]h
i=1; for ￿ 2 [0;1]; we have that
H( ￿ u1(:);:::; ￿ uh(:)) ￿ H( u1(:);:::; uh(:)): Loosely, household indi⁄erence
surfaces in the space of individual utilities are linear or strictly convex to
the origin;
￿ di⁄erentiability to any required order at all points in the domain of the
function.
The ￿rst of these properties seems reasonable for any household. As far
as quasi-concavity is concerned, the welfare economics literature takes as lim-
iting cases the weighted utilitarian case, H =
P
￿iui(xi); ￿i ￿ 0;
P
￿i = 1;
and the Rawlsian H = minui[ui(xi)]h
i=1: The ￿rst displays no inequality aver-
sion, in the sense that all pro￿les that give the same (weighted) sum of utilities
are equally good, whatever they may imply for inequality of utility among the
household members. The Rawlsian possesses in￿nite inequality aversion, in that
the household would be seeking to maximise the utility of its worst-o⁄ member.
All strictly quasi-concave functions between these extremes are possible house-
hold welfare functions, with varying degrees of inequality aversion. The third
property is a useful technical assumption.12
The key idea is that the function provides an analytical device that allows
the economist to derive the implications for resource allocation of any speci￿c
set of ethical or value judgements that would determine its precise form, or
indeed of all sets of value judgements that possess these three properties. Its
widespread use in public economics, international economics and applied welfare
economics generally over the past half-century con￿rms its usefulness.
As we argue below, the assumption that the household chooses its resource
allocation by a process of Nash bargaining is equivalent to choosing a speci￿c
form for the HWF. The assumption about the process by which the household
consensus is reached is su¢ cient to place a speci￿c structure on the HWF. The
welfare economists at the time, see Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947). Needless to say
there has been considerable further development since then. For good surveys see Boadway
and Bruce (1984) Jehle and Reny (2001) and Mas-Colell et al (1995).
12Note that the limiting case of the Rawlsian HWF possesses only the weak Pareto property
Hi ￿ 0 and is not everywhere di⁄erentiable, and so strictly speaking is excluded by these
assumptions. It can however be approximated arbitrarily closely by a function that does
possess these properties.
6key innovation that resulted from this, yielding a signi￿cant extension of Samuel-
son￿ s approach, was, in e⁄ect, to introduce exogenous variables such as prices,
wages and non-wage income, as well as other "extrahousehold environmental
parameters"13 (EEP￿ s) into the HWF as conditioning variables that determine
the household￿ s ordering over the utility pro￿les of its members.
Suppose now that the household faces a price vector p 2 Rn
++ and the house-
hold members have exogenously given individual non-wage incomes ￿i; with
￿ =
P
i ￿i: If the individuals pool their incomes, we can write the household￿ s
budget constraint as px ￿ ￿; and Samuelson formulated the household￿ s re-
source allocation problem as that of maximising H(:) subject to this constraint.
We summarise his discussion of this problem by the following14
Theorem (Samuelson, 1956): If there exists a HWF H(:) with the three
properties given above, the following statements hold:
(i) Decentralisation: if ^ xi are solutions to the problem maxxi H(:) s:t: px ￿
￿; there exist functions si(p;￿); , with
P
i si(p;￿) = ￿; such that ^ xi are also
solutions to the problems maxxi ui(xi) s:t: pxi ￿ si(p;￿); i = 1;::h: Samuelson
termed the functions si(p;￿) the sharing rule. Conversely, existence of this
sharing rule implies existence of a HWF.
(ii) Aggregation: Let vi(p;si) be the indirect utility functions derived as the
value functions of the problems maxxi ui(xi) s:t: pxi ￿ si for any si: Then the
si(p;￿) are the solutions to the problem15 maxsi H(v1(p;s1);:::;vh(p;sh)) s:t: P
i si ￿ ￿: Furthermore let x =
P
i xi be the household￿ s aggregate demand vec-
tor. Then the value function in this latter problem, say v(p;￿); possesses all the
properties of an indirect utility function, with in particular rpv(p;￿) = ￿v￿x
(Roy￿ s Identity). We can call v￿ the household￿ s marginal utility of income.
Intuitively, we can interpret the HWF as formally identical to an individual
utility function with weak separability in consumptions, with the quantity of
each physical good consumed by each household member viewed as a separate
good. Then the standard results on two-stage budgeting16 apply: the household
can be modelled as ￿rst allocating its total expenditure among its members, and
then within each expenditure category, i.e. for each individual, allocating the
given expenditure optimally over goods.
Note that the sharing rule functions necessarily contain as arguments prices
and total non-wage income, because these are the exogenous variables in the
problem that generates them. Intuitively, shifts in the household￿ s budget con-
straint and corresponding utility possibility set can be expected to change the
13The terminology introduced in McElroy (1990).
14We state this theorem here in its modern form. This is meant to summarise Samuelson￿ s
lengthy discussion of sharing rules as well as his formal theorem. For proofs, see Mas-Colell
et al, (1995), ch. 4. The usual context for this theorem is the economy as a whole, but of
course it immediately applies to the household as a small economy. The key idea is "[The]
problems of home economics are, abstractly conceived, exactly of the same logical character
as the general problem of government and social welfare." (Samuelson, Ibid., p 10).
15We are free to choose utility functions which make H(:) here a quasiconcave function of
the si; so that the second order conditions will be satis￿ed.
16See Gorman (1961) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
7distribution of income among household members given its unchanged prefer-
ences over their relative well being. Note, however, that they do not depend on
the individual non-wage incomes: any reallocation of these that leaves the total
unchanged always also leaves the share functions unchanged. This, as we shall
see below, is generally in contrast to the results of bargaining models.
The aggregation aspect of the theorem is also important. This implies that
the aggregate household demands for goods, the vector x(p;￿); can be modelled
as if they were the demands of a single ￿ctitious consumer with the indirect
utility function v(p;￿): This is a complete description of preferences, and an
expenditure function and a direct utility function u(x) (which we refer to as
the household utility function) for this ￿ctitious individual can be derived from
it in the usual way. The assumptions on the HWF, combined with the form
of its maximisation problem (including the pooled budget constraint) give a
problem in the space of aggregate household consumption vectors, maxx u(x)
s:t: px ￿ ￿; that is identical in form to the problem of an individual consumer,
and so the resulting aggregate demands will have all the regularity properties
of the demand functions derived from the model of the individual consumer.
We can derive aggregate demands by maximising a household utility function
subject to the aggregate budget constraint. We should however not lose sight of
the fact that underlying these demands is an allocation of consumptions among
household members that re￿ ects the household￿ s sharing rule, or equivalently,
maximises the HWF.
Becker￿ s approach is in one sense a special case of Samuelson￿ s. On the
other hand, the models of the household Becker formulates are much richer
than Samuelson￿ s general equilbium pure exchange model and are concerned
with the analysis of a far wider range of issues. Opinions can di⁄er on the
extent to which the signi￿cance of the insights Becker derives outweighs any
reservations one may have about the ethical presuppositions represented by the
form of his HWF, as well as about its descriptive realism.17
Samuelson also considered the approach to modelling household demand that
has since become known as Gorman Aggregation.18 This can be thought of as
providing a solution to the problem of deriving well-behaved aggregate demand
functions for a group of consumers, for example a household, without having to
specify explicitly a resource allocation process within the group, other than that
individuals within it receive income shares, somehow determined. Suppose each
household member i has a strictly positive demand for each good j = 1;::;n
that takes the functional form
xij = aij(p) + bj(p)si (1)
where si is i0s total expenditure on goods and aij(p) and bj(p) are given func-
tions. Then
P
i xij; the aggregate household demand for each good j; is a func-
tion only of the price vector and aggregate household income ￿ =
P
i si:This is
17We have had students who maintain that Becker￿ s HWF is fully descriptive of the house-
holds they have grown up in. For a good overall assessment see Pollak (2003).
18See Samuelson (1956), Gorman (1959) as well as Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
8because, when all demands are strictly positive, a reallocation of this aggregate
income among household members leaves aggregate demand unchanged, since
the coe¢ cients bj(p) are the same for all i.
Note however that if a good, for example one person￿ s leisure, is always
consumed in a positive amount by only that person, and in zero quantity by all
others, then its total household demand is a function only of that individual￿ s
income, and not of aggregate household income. A pure redistribution of total
income that changed one individual￿ s income share would change the demand
for her leisure.
The demands in (1) are generated by a utility maximisation process if and
only if each household member has the Gorman polar form of indirect utility
function
vi(p;si) = ￿i(p) + ￿(p)si (2)
Thus one could argue that placing these very strong restrictions on preferences
would allow an econometrician to work with aggregate household demand func-
tions without having to construct a household model. Samuelson dismissed this
approach as much too restrictive. Moreover, if demands are generated by indi-
vidual utility maximisation given some distribution of total expenditures, then
the resulting household resource allocation must be Pareto e¢ cient, as a speci￿c
implication of the fact that all consumers face the same price ratios of all pairs
of goods. So even assuming the Gorman polar form implies some restriction on
the household decision process.
Samuelson clearly felt con￿dent that he had given a satisfactory solution to
the problem he had posed. Why was this solution apparently rejected by most
of the subsequent contributors to the literature? One reason put forward19 was
that the process of household formation cannot be analysed by a household util-
ity function approach. This is not correct. Prior to formation of a household,
the potential members must be able to predict the allocations they will obtain
within the household and compare them to the next best alternative. They
must do this by solving the HWF-maximisation problem. This is qualitatively
no di⁄erent to what is assumed in models that use Nash bargaining, i.e. a spe-
ci￿c HWF, to analyse household formation or the marriage decision, and much
more general. Another20 was that Samuelson￿ s approach misses the elements
of con￿ ict as well as cooperation that characterise household decision taking.
This is also not correct (though it is true of Becker￿ s special case of the HWF).
Samuelson￿ s formulation is quite general as to the processes that generate the
HWF, and these may well involve con￿ ict. The HWF simply represents the
outcome of its resolution.
McElroy and Horney, in motivating their Nash bargaining approach, argue
that Samuelson￿ s solution implies that the outcomes of family decisions are
"empirically indistinguishable from those of constrained utility maximisation"
in the individual consumer model. This is the key point, and we now turn to it.
19See for example Nerlove (1974).
20See Manser and Brown (1980).
92.2 Symmetry, anonymity and pooling
2.2.1 Symmetry
The aggregation part of Samuelson￿ s Theorem says that the household can be
analysed as if it generates its aggregate demands x(p;￿) by solving the problem
maxx u(x) s:t: px ￿ ￿; where u(:) has all the properties of an individual utility
function. This implies that the aggregate household demands will have the same
properties as those of individual demands in the standard consumer model, and
in particular that the Slutsky matrix of compensated demand derivatives, where
"compensation" in this case must be de￿ned as holding the value of the HWF
constant, will be symmetric and negative semide￿nite.
For later reference, it is useful to illustrate Samuelson￿ s Theorem in terms
of a simple two-person labour supply model. De￿ne the ￿rst two goods as the
respective leisure consumptions of the two household members, with therefore
the ￿rst two prices as their wage rates wi; i = 1;2: The remaining n￿2 goods are
consumption goods, and let us assume that their prices remain constant relative
to each other, so that we can apply Hicks￿ s Composite Commodity Theorem and
write the utility functions as ui(xi;li); where x is the composite consumption





i(wi + ￿i); where we have normalised wages and prices so that the
composite consumption commodity has a price of 1, and total time endowment
of each household member is normalised at 1, so (1 ￿ li) is that individual￿ s
labour supply.21
Given the sharing rule interpretation of the household equilibrium, each
individual solves maxxili ui(xi;li) s:t: wili + xi ￿ si for given si to yield the

















= ￿ i = 1;2 (4)











21Given the assumption that each i has a positive market labour supply. Where one of the
household members, for example a child, necessarily has zero market labour supplies, we can
simply set the corresponding li = 1: To deal with cases in which an individual may choose
between zero and positive labour supply, we simply have to extend the formulation of the




= ￿(1 ￿ li) i = 1;2 (7)
as should be the case if v(:) is an indirect utility function for the ￿ctitious
aggregate household member. The direct utility function corresponding to this
indirect utility function can be written as u(x;l1;l2) with x =
P
i xi:
Now, since u(x;l1;l2) has the properties of an individual utility function,
maximising it subject to the budget constraint
P
i wili + x ￿
P
i(wi + ￿i)
yields leisure demand functions li(w1;w2;￿) to which the standard results of
the individual labour supply model apply. In particular, we have symmetry of













These are in this model the negatives of the compensated labour supply deriv-
atives.
In the literature it is claimed that the symmetry of compensated labour
supply derivatives of husbands and wives is rejected by the data, which in turn
implies rejection of this implication of Samuelson￿ s Theorem. As we argue at
some length in Apps and Rees (2007a), because they are based on the simple
division of time between market work and leisure and do not take account
of household production, these studies do not in fact provide a satisfactory
empirical test of Samuelson￿ s model. Nevertheless, we doubt that symmetry
would hold in an empirical analysis that did correctly specify the model.
2.2.2 Anonymity and pooling
The formulation of the budget constraint, with aggregate household expendi-
ture constrained by aggregate household income, rests, as we pointed out earlier,
on the assumption that members of the household in e⁄ect pool their incomes,
in the sense that they are prepared implicitly or explicitly to make whatever
transfers of income between themselves are necessary to achieve the household
optimum. The individual shares in the total value of consumption are derived
from the household optimisation, rather than being ￿xed a priori by some shar-
ing rule not derived in this way.23 In the interests of clarity, we believe that the
term "income pooling" should be reserved for this kind of formulation of the
budget constraint in a household model.
As we just saw, in Samuelson￿ s model consumption and leisure demands,
labour supplies and the household sharing rule are functions only of aggregate
household income. This implies in turn that the e⁄ect on these demands, sup-
plies and income shares of an increase in an individual￿ s non-wage income does
not depend on who that individual is - an additional $1 of income has the same
22That is, some given value of the HWF.
23What Samuelson called a "shibboleth sharing rule".
11e⁄ect regardless of to whom it accrues. This has come to be known in the lit-
erature as the "Pooling Hypothesis", since it appears to be the result of the
assumption that income is pooled to obtain the budget constraint.
This terminology is unfortunate, because there are several models, including
the bargaining models that we look at in the next section, which have household
budget constraints that assume income pooling, but in which the e⁄ects of a
change in individual income do depend on the identity of that individual, at
least for some types of income change. Moreover, in non-cooperative models of
household public good provision, where income pooling is not assumed, if both
individuals supply positive amounts of the public good at the Nash equilibrium,
then a redistribution of income between the two individuals has no e⁄ect, and
only total income matters. In other words, income pooling as such is neither
necessary nor su¢ cient for the ￿Pooling Hypothesis￿to be a result of a model,
and whether it is or is not depends crucially on the rest of the structure of the
model, as well as on what type of income change is being considered. It seems
to us therefore that it would be much better to call this e⁄ect the "Anonymity
Hypothesis", since it is really saying that the identity of the income recipient
does not matter. It is this result of a model, and not income pooling per se,
that would be rejected when the data seem to show that the e⁄ects of an income
change depend on precisely whose income has in fact changed. Samuelson￿ s
model does imply the Anonymity Hypothesis. There is now quite a substantial
body of empirical work that concludes that this hypothesis is rejected by the
data.24
This discussion suggests that Samuelson￿ s formulation was too successful in
solving the problem of household decision taking - it produced a model with
identical results to the individual model, as McElroy and Horney pointed out.
For them and other proponents of bargaining models, the answer was to base
the model on the process by which a household consensus is achieved. Before
considering the Nash bargaining approach in some depth, we look at three gener-
alisations of Samuelson￿ s model: the incorporation of household production; the
inclusion of children; and the generalisation of the household welfare function.
2.3 Generalising Samuelson
2.3.1 Household production
The papers by Apps (1981), (1982), and Apps and Rees (1988), (1997), (1999),
(2001), fall within the Samuelson tradition, in that they were concerned with
extending existing results, primarily in labour and public economics rather than
demand theory in general, to household models. They generalise Samuelson
in that they include household production25 as an essential component of the
models. Indeed, for the issues with which these papers were concerned, it was
seen to be essential not only to model the multi-person household, but also to
24For the early contributions see Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990).
25Drawing on Gronau (1986).
12incorporate household production. There was no point in doing one without the
other.
Apps (1981) used a two-sector general equilibrium model to analyse the
incidence of income taxation in an economy in which di⁄erences in market wage
rates associated with non-economic characteristics, in particular gender, are
due not to innate di⁄erences in productivity,26 as in the standard optimal tax
models, but rather to labour market discrimination, which "crowds" women into
low-wage occupations. In this model, men supply labour in a high-wage sector
to produce a market good, and women work in a low-wage sector to produce
a second market good, as well as working within the household to produce a
domestic good. The implicit price a man pays for this domestic good cannot
be less than the opportunity cost of his wife￿ s time, valued at the wage women
receive in the low-wage market sector, since women are assumed free to move
between market and household work. Women are not however allowed access
to the high-wage sector. There is a perfectly competitive marriage market so
that, in equilibrium, no woman could demand more than the going market price
for the household good. There are no transfers or income pooling within the
household: each spouse consumes goods to a value given by the income from
his or her own labour supply plus individual non-wage income. Goods prices
and men￿ s and women￿ s wage rates are determined in a competitive general
equilibrium by equalities of demands and supplies of all goods and labour.
Anonymity does not hold in this model ￿an increment of income to a man
has in general di⁄erent e⁄ects to those of an income increment to a woman.
Moreover, symmetry of compensated labour supply derivatives with respect to
each other￿ s wage rates also does not hold. For example, an increase in the male
net wage (caused, say, by a reduction in the tax rate) a⁄ects the labour supply
of a woman not through a pooled budget constraint, but rather through a set
of comparative statics e⁄ects on the price of the market good produced by men
and the demands for the household and market goods produced by women.
Although it does not involve bargaining or threat points, the model high-
lights the important idea that the utility level partners can achieve within the
household depends crucially on their outside opportunities, in this case condi-
tions on their respective labour markets. Labour market discrimination that
reduces the market wage of women will also reduce what they can obtain within
the household. It embodies a form of the "separate spheres" idea of Lundberg
and Pollak (1993), but applied to household production rather than purchases
of household public goods.
The later papers cited above generalise this early model by basing the solu-
tion for the household resource allocation on Samuelson￿ s household consensus,
thus allowing for the possibility of intrahousehold transfers and imperfect mar-
kets. They note, for example in Apps and Rees (1988), that in characterising a
household equilibrium, it is enough simply to assume that the household seeks to
achieve Pareto e¢ ciency, since this is a common element in all HWF￿ s. However,
26At least, not initially, though in the long run the e⁄ect of labour market discrimination
is to create di⁄erences in the accumulation of human capital and therefore in individual
productivities. These e⁄ects are modelled endogenously.
13they also go on to point out (p. 365)
The general characterisation of the household equilibrium by the
[Pareto] e¢ ciency conditions [...] allows us to bring out in a general
way the signi￿cance of household distribution e⁄ects, but does not
in itself allow a precise analysis of these. For this it is necessary to
specify how the household distributes income among its members,
and this requires a more substantive hypothesis than that the ￿nal
allocation is Pareto e¢ cient.
Thus, in carrying out the comparative statics of the models, they assume
the existence of a HWF or, equivalently, a sharing rule.
The papers cited above use a variety of models, each designed to ￿t the
problem at hand. Apps and Rees (1988) is concerned with the implications
for tax policy of the relationship between the distributional preferences of the
policy-maker or "planner" and those of the household. It shows how intra-
household distributional terms will enter expressions for optimal taxation and
tax reform, and also derives conditions under which they can be ignored - the
"non-dissonance" case. Of course, the standard optimal taxation and tax reform
literature does indeed ignore these terms, because it is based on an individual
model.27 But in addition to this, one may want to carry out tax analysis that
requires a household model but focusses on inter- rather than intra-household
distributional e⁄ects,28 and for this it is useful to know what is being assumed
in suppressing the latter. The later papers deal with issues such as the prob-
lem of "retrievability" or identi￿ability of the sharing rule in the presence of
household production, the choice of the individual vs. the couple as the tax
unit in an income tax system, the measurement of child costs, and the choice of
tax/subsidy policies to solve the problem of fertility decline. Rather than going
through the variety of models, we present here a general model,29 which sug-
gests in particular how the model with household production can be extended
to include children.
2.3.2 Children and child care
We would argue that in formulating models that explicitly include children, we
should treat them as individuals with their own utility functions, rather than as
"public goods" consumed by their parents.This approach seems to be far more
consistent with the spirit of household models. The "children as household
public goods" approach seems to have originated with the Nash bargaining
models, which are constrained to two-person bargaining and therefore cannot
handle children as individuals. In the spirit of Samuelson, we leave open the
question of the extent to which children participate in the decision process of
the household.
27See for example the seminal papers in this literature, Mirrlees (1971) and Sheshinski
(1972).
28See for example Apps and Rees (2007c).
29This closely follows that in Apps and Rees (2001).
14It can be argued that in the absence of children, household production takes
on far less signi￿cance as an economic activity than when they are present. The
arrival of children generates a very large demand for child care and it is this
that makes inclusion of household production in the model absolutely essential.
This in turn has important implications for female labour supply and household
income, and indeed the entire economics of the household.30
As in the two-adult household considered in the previous sections, the house-
hold with children can be modelled as if it were a small economy, and the stan-
dard results of general equilibrium theory can be applied in a straightforward
way. The household buys a vector x of market goods which it consumes directly,
a vector b of market goods which it uses as intermediate goods in domestic pro-
duction, including possibly child care, a vector g of household public goods, and
it produces a vector y of household private goods. We identify domestic child
care outputs explicitly as ck; k = 1;:::;K where K ￿ 1 is the number of children
in the household and k denotes an individual child. The household technology
is assumed subject to non-increasing returns and no joint production, and is
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i is i￿ s time input into production of household good j and tk
i is the time
i spends on care of child k. i = f;m are the two adults and only they supply





The utility functions of adults are de￿ned on their consumptions of the vector
of market goods, xi, the vector of household private goods, yi, pure leisure (a
scalar), li, and the vector of household public goods, g:
ui = ui(xi;yi;li;g) i = f;m (11)
The utility functions of children are de￿ned on market goods, xk, household
private goods, yk, child care outputs, ck, and household public goods, g:
uk = uk(xk;yk;ck;g) k = 1;:::;K (12)
All utility functions are strictly quasi-concave and increasing, and at least twice
continuously di⁄erentiable.
Each adult divides his or her time between general household production,
child care, market labour supply zi and pure leisure. Thus we have the time
constraints:
ti + li + zi = 1 i = f;m (13)
30See Apps and Rees (2005), where this view is supported by data from a number of coun-
tries.
31If domestic help, including child care, is bought on the market then this is one of the
market goods with the corresponding wage rate as its price. The essential assumption is that








i is the total time i spends in household goods produc-
tion and child care. It is assumed that all of a child￿ s time is pure leisure32.
To complete the model we specify the household budget constraint. Corre-
sponding to the vector x is the given price vector p, to the vector b the given
price vector q; and to the vector g the given price vector r. Some market goods
may of course be both ￿nal consumption and intermediate goods, in which case
the corresponding elements of p and q will be identical. Given the market wage
rates wi and non-wage incomes ￿i, the budget constraint is
px + qb + rg ￿
X
i=f;m
(wizi + ￿i) (14)
which, eliminating the time constraints, can be equivalently written as
px + qb + rg +
X
i=f;m
wi(ti + li) ￿
X
i=f;m
(wi + ￿i) (15)
The household acts as if it maximises H(:) subject to the constraints on the
domestic technology and expenditure given in (9), (10) and (15). Given our
assumptions, the ￿rst-order conditions for this problem are both necessary and
su¢ cient for an optimum and are thoroughly familiar from standard general
equilibrium theory.33 Assuming all choice variables are strictly positive at the
optimum we have:
￿ marginal rates of substitution between any pair of goods are equalised
across household members;
￿ inputs are allocated so as to equalise their marginal value products in all
uses;
￿ where both adults supply market labour, i￿ s market wage measures the
marginal value product of time i spends in any household production or
child care activity and also the marginal value of leisure;34
￿ the Samuelson conditions characterise the consumption of household pub-
lic goods, and in particular the optimal output of such a good equates its
price to a weighted sum of its marginal utilities to the household members,




32In both developing and developed countries children as usually de￿ned, i.e. persons under
the age of 16, may in fact supply both market and household labour. This can be handled
formally by increasing the number of "adults" in the household.
33As long as we are only concerned with characterising the household equilibrium, we could
just as well have assumed the household simply ￿nds a Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium, rather
than maximising a HWF. Comparative statics analysis however requires a HWF.
34Where one adult supplies no market labour, the marginal value product of his/her time
in household production is equal to the marginal value of leisure and is equal to or greater
than the market wage.
35That is, an individual￿ s weight in the household resource allocation, as measured by this
derivative, determines the extent to which his or her preferences for the household public good
in￿uence its total output.
16￿ the amount of care given to child k equates the marginal cost of this care
to its weighted marginal value product, where the weight is again the
equilibrium value H￿
k:
We can solve for the vectors of demands, outputs of household goods and
child care, and labour supplies as functions of prices, wage rates and non-wage
incomes. All these functions are in principle observable, though existing datasets
provide only very incomplete information that does not allow them to be esti-
mated at the level of generality of this model. Apps and Rees (2001) provide
an example of the sorts of assumptions that have to be made to estimate this
model with existing datasets.
An objection to this approach might be: What is the point of having a model
that cannot be estimated? Our reply would be that model-building should not
be constrained by what happen to be the currently available datasets.36 Model-
building unconstrained by data availability should lead to an awareness of the
kinds of data that need to be collected. It also helps us to see the way in which
empirical models make assumptions that amount to making up the missing data.
This model helps to clarify exactly what we might mean by "the costs of
children". The cost of a child is simply the value of the bundle of goods -
market, household and public - plus the cost of child care, that the child receives
at the equilibrium household allocation, i.e. as the value of the resources the
household chooses to allocate to her.
On the given assumptions, there can be associated with the equilibrium
allocation a set of implicit prices for the domestically produced goods, including
child care, given by their marginal costs at the equilibrium. Let the vector of
implicit prices of household private goods be denoted by ￿￿ and let ￿￿
k denote
the equilibrium household price of child care for the k￿ th child. Then the full
consumption cost of child k is given by
C￿
k = pxk￿ + ￿￿yk￿ + ￿￿
kc￿
k + r[g￿ ￿ g￿
￿k] (16)
that is, by the cost of the bundle of market, public and domestic private goods
and child care that the child consumes at the equilibrium household allocation
(denoted by asterisks). Here r[g￿￿g￿
￿k] is the cost associated with the increased
demand for household public goods that child k imposes, with g￿
￿k denoting
the vector of household public goods that would optimally be provided in the
absence of child k.37 Our contention then is that it is this measure of the cost
of a child that should ideally be estimated in child cost studies. More usually,
such studies construct "adult equivalence scales" for children based either upon
minimal physiological needs, or estimates of the increase in income required to
hold parental utility constant, given their expenditure on consumption goods
for the children, i.e.
P
k pxk￿:
36For example, macroeconomics would not exist if that principle had been followed. National
income accounting came after Keynes.
37For example, if a shared good such as housing space is a household public good, then its
consumption is likely to increase with the number of children. If not, this term is just zero.
172.3.3 Generalising the Household Welfare Function
In Section 2.4.1 we discuss the Nash bargaining approach in some detail and ar-
gue there that the key general idea it contains is that the household￿ s preference
ordering over the utility pro￿les of its members depends on their wage rates and
non-wage incomes. It is the absence of these in Samuelson￿ s HWF that leads
it to give the anonymity and symmetry results. Returning, for simplicity of
notation, to the two-person household model, and writing the HWF now38 as
H = H(u1(x1;l1);u2(x2;l2);w1;￿1;w2;￿2) (17)
allows us to take over the idea that the household preference ordering depends
on these exogenous variables, without constraining us to accept the speci￿c
rationale - their embodiment in formal threat points - that makes their presence
natural in the Nash bargaining model. We call this the generalised household
welfare function (GHWF).





(wili + xi) ￿
X
i
(wi + ￿i) + t (19)
where t is thought of as a transfer to the household that is not assigned to
any one individual, and does not a⁄ect the household￿ s preferences over utility
pro￿les.
It is perhaps pointless to speculate on whether Samuelson would have ap-
proved of this step at the time he wrote his paper on social indi⁄erence curves.
On the one hand, he clearly conceived of social welfare functions in very general
terms indeed. Thus in his discussion of social welfare functions in the context
of the economy as a whole40 he writes
Without inquiring into its origins, we take as a starting point for
our discussion a function of all the economic magnitudes of a system
which is supposed to characterize some ethical belief.....Any possible
opinion is permissible... We only require that the belief is such as
to admit of an unequivocal answer as to whether one con￿guration
of the economic system is "better" or "worse" than any other, or
38We could also adopt McElroy￿ s suggestion of including a vector of EEP￿ s that in￿uence
this preference ordering though not the household budget constraint. Examples of such vari-
ables typically cited are: indicators of gender discrimination in labour markets; the ratio of
marriagable men to women, the so-called sex ratio; taxes and transfers that change with the
individual￿ s marital status; and the nature of divorce laws. These variables will often be spe-
ci￿c to the precise context of the analysis. For example, analysis of household decisions in a
developing country may include dowries and bride prices among these variables.
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40Samuelson (1947) pp. 221, 222.
18"indi⁄erent", and that these relationships are transitive....numerous
individuals ￿nd it of interest to specialize the form of [the SWF]...For
one thing, prices are not usually included in the welfare function
itself, except very indirectly through the e⁄ects of di⁄erent prices
and wages upon the quantities of consumption, work etc.
Applied to the household, we could certainly accept that the opinion that
the household￿ s preferences over utility pro￿les of its members should depend
on their wages and non-wage incomes is a permissible ethical belief, in the sense
that we may well expect household members to agree that it should be the
case.41 Then we can model their objective function in a way that corresponds
to this belief. Samuelson￿ s exclusion of prices from the social welfare function
is no doubt due to the fact that in the case of the economy as a whole, these are
endogenous variables. Indeed, in applications of the social welfare function, for
example in optimal tax theory, it is usual to write it as a function of individual
utilities alone. However, in the case of the household, wages and non-wage
incomes are exogenous, and so an objection on grounds of endogeneity would
not apply. We regard the GHWF as the appropriate extension of the idea of a
social welfare function to the case of the household.
In Apps and Rees (2007b) we suggest reasonable general restrictions on the
way in which the variables wi;￿i i = 1;2 should a⁄ect the preference ordering
over utility pro￿les. Increases in w1 and ￿1 should increase the relative weight
the household gives to 1￿ s utility at any point, and increases in w2 and ￿2 should
reduce it. It is shown that anonymity will not in general hold in this model, and,
as we should expect from Pollak￿ s (1977) analysis of price-dependent preferences,
the Slutsky matrix is not in general symmetric and negative semide￿nite. Fur-
thermore, Slutsky equations for the sharing rule can be derived, which provide
testable implications of the model. These results generalise those obtained from
speci￿c cooperative models, such as the bargaining models and the collective
model, which can be regarded as being based on speci￿c forms of the GHWF.
We now turn to these.
2.4 Nash bargaining and the collective model
2.4.1 Nash bargaining
The two papers that introduced Nash bargaining models into the household
economics literature illustrate nicely the two main concerns of this literature
pointed out earlier in the Introduction. The paper by Manser and Brown (1980)
is concerned with analysing the marriage decision, and takes as its point of de-
parture the work by Becker on the theory of marriage.42 The paper stresses the
importance of modelling the household as consisting of individuals with their
41Possibly because they de￿ne the values of outside options, but other reasons are also
possible. For example, they may be taken as an indicator of the contribution an individual
makes to the household budget, and therefore of his or her entitlement to a share in household
full income.
42See Becker (1973), (1974).
19own utility functions, and of retaining the elements of con￿ ict as well as coopera-
tion that are involved in the household resource allocation decision. Though the
paper is correct in arguing that Becker￿ s formulation of the household objective
function, as the utility function of the ￿head of the household￿ , suppresses these
aspects of household decision taking, they are wrong in dismissing Samuelson￿ s
approach as if it also did this. The HWF retains the separate utility functions
of individuals, is quite general about the types of considerations that determine
the trade-o⁄s between their utilities - by no means ruling out con￿ ict - and, in
the equivalent concept of the sharing rule, provides a ￿ exible and convenient
way of analysing the intra-household income distribution.
The second paper, by McElroy and Horney (1981), is on the other hand
concerned with the issue Samuelson saw as central: what can be said about the
properties of household demands when we recognise that the household consists
of more than one individual? The paper shows that by modelling the household
resource allocation process as a cooperative Nash bargaining game, well-de￿ned
demand functions can be derived on which testable restrictions can be placed,
di⁄ering in important ways from those derived from the standard demand theory
(and therefore from Samuelson￿ s model as set out in Section 2.1). The paper
provides a detailed analysis of the structure of the household demand functions
implied by the Nash bargaining hypothesis.
The two papers di⁄er in the details of the formulation of their models.
Manser and Brown emphasise the existence of household public goods and love
and caring in explaining why marriage generates a surplus of utility over that
which is obtained when the two individuals live separately. The existence of
this surplus explains why marriage (or more generally formation of a house-
hold) takes place, while the analytical problem, solved by Nash bargaining, is
to determine how this surplus is shared. In McElroy and Horney￿ s paper, goods
may also be private (i.e. consumption by one individual reduces the amount
available for the other), love plays no explicit role (though the utility of each
individual depends also on the consumptions of the other), and the existence of
a surplus from marriage is simply assumed.
The existence of a surplus to be bargained over is one necessary component
of a Nash bargaining model, the speci￿cation of the "threat points", the utilities
that will be achieved by the respective parties if no agreement is reached, is the
other. Both papers take the maximum (expected) utility each individual could
achieve outside the household in question as the threat point. Since McElroy
and Horney are concerned with an ongoing household, this has come to be
called a "divorce threat point", though in the case of Manser and Brown, since
they are analysing conditions under which a not-yet-existing household will be
formed, this is a misnomer. Their threat point is the next best expected utility
an individual can obtain on the marriage market.
We formalise the bargaining approach in a way that emphasises its appli-
cation to labour supply decisions, although this was not in fact the approach
of either of the two original papers. Let vi(wi;￿i) denote the highest expected
utility that individual i = 1;2 could obtain outside the household in ques-
tion. These are exogenously given reservation constraints. They are obtained
20by solving the problem maxui(xi;li) s:t: wili +xi ￿ wi +￿i; where li is again
i￿ s leisure consumption and xi consumption of a household public good43 with
price normalised at 1. The two-person household is then assumed to solve the
problem




wili + x ￿
X
i
(wi + ￿i) (21)
Note that in this model, as in Samuelson￿ s, the budget constraint implies income
pooling, the possibility of unrestricted lump sum transfers between the individu-
als. Leisure and consumption demands of the household are now li(w1;￿1;w2;￿2);
x(w1;￿1;w2;￿2). The household surplus is generated because with the same
leisure consumptions each member can have more of the household public good
than when living separately. The demand functions have the "adding-up" and
zero degree homogeneity44 properties of standard Marshallian demand func-
tions, but the properties of anonymity and symmetry of compensated leisure
demands discussed in the previous section no longer hold in general, as McEl-
roy and Horney show.
Note that there is a speci￿c form of GHWF in this problem, for, after all,
what is the Nash product HN; the maximand in the Nash bargaining problem,
but a representation of the household￿ s preference ordering over the individual
utilities? As with the Stone-Geary individual utility function, it is a type of
Cobb-Douglas function (de￿ned on utility pairs rather than goods) on a re-
stricted coordinate space45 with origin at (v1;v2) rather than (0;0): It is easy
to show46 that it possesses the general properties of a GHWF mentioned in the
previous section, though not for all types of redistribution of non-wage incomes.
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) pointed out that the model has a problem,
in that it does predict anonymity with respect to individual non-wage income
changes that leave threat points unchanged. Thus suppose, in the event of
divorce, individual 1 would receive a state transfer t; whereas, while married,
individual 2 receives this transfer. Now consider a policy change that switches
payment of t from 2 to 1 also while they are married. This leads to no change
in the threat points, and also no change in total income, the right hand side
of the budget constraint, so there would be no e⁄ect on the Nash bargaining
equilibrium. Against this, Lundberg and Pollak (1993) argued that it might
be expected that such a change would increase 1￿ s in￿ uence over the household
43Taking consumption x as a household public rather than private good is the simplest
way, in the absence of household production, to ensure a utility surplus from formation of the
household. If x here were a private good, it would not be possible for both individuals to be
better o⁄ in the joint household. Our own preference however is to follow Becker and show
how such a surplus can be generated by improvements in the production set arising from joint
rather than individual household production.
44The indirect utility functions vi(:) are invariant to equiproportionate changes in all prices
and incomes, and these also leave the budget constraint una⁄ected.
45See also Lundberg and Pollak (1993), p.995.
46See Apps and Rees (2007b).
21resource allocation, while Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) later presented
evidence to show that a similar policy change in the UK did in fact cause a
change in household consumption patterns in the expected direction. This ar-
gument motivated their formulation of the "separate spheres bargaining model",
to which we now turn.
2.4.2 Nash bargaining with non-cooperative threat points
The idea underlying the separate spheres bargaining model is to base the threat
points in the Nash bargaining game on separate budget constraints for the two
partners in the household, in a way that ensures that anonymity will not hold,
even under the kind of transfer policy change just discussed.
The ￿rst step is to introduce the idea, originally proposed by Ulph (1988),
and Woolley (1988), of basing the threat points not on the utilities the partners
would receive if they divorced, but rather on the utilities they achieve in a non-
cooperative Nash equilibrium within the existing household. There are in any
case good arguments against post-divorce utilities as threat points - divorce may
simply be too drastic and costly a fall-back point in the event of failure to agree
on division of the utility surplus generated by the two-person household, and so
may not be a credible threat. But a Nash bargaining model must have threat
points, and so an alternative is to base them on a non-cooperative equilibrium
within an ongoing household.
The next step is to characterise these threat points. How would people be-
have if, while remaining within the household, they do not cooperate to achieve
the full bene￿ts that are feasible, because they cannot agree on how to share
them? Suppose now that there are two household public goods, x1 and x2; so
that the individual utility functions are ui(x1;x2;li); i = 1;2: In a cooperative
equilibrium, the individuals will jointly agree on how much of these goods to buy
and consume.47 In a non-cooperative game with Nash equilibrium as the solu-
tion concept (sometimes called Cournot-Nash equilibrium to distinguish it more
sharply from the Nash bargaining equilibrium), the partners will independently
choose how much of these to buy to maximise their own individual utilities,
taking as given the amount bought by the other. As in standard oligopoly mod-
els, this de￿nes a set of reaction functions, the solution of which determines the
Nash equilibrium.
The papers on voluntary-contribution public goods games by Warr (1983)
and Bergstrom et. al. (1987) show that two types of Nash equilibrium are
possible in such games. Both players may choose to contribute positive amounts
of each public good, in which case a key result is that a small transfer of income
between them will leave the supplies of the public goods and the individual
utilities of the players una⁄ected. In that case therefore a Nash bargaining
model with its threat points de￿ned by this non-cooperative equilibrium would,
as pointed out earlier, actually predict anonymity with respect to the kinds of
47Note that there is no household production in this model, as is the case with all the
bargaining models considered so far. Ott (1992) appears to have been the ￿rst to introduce
household production into the Nash bargaining model.
22policy change Lundberg and Pollak are concerned with, for exactly the same
reason as before: such a transfer changes neither the threat points nor the
budget constraint.
Alternatively, there may be a non-cooperative equilibrium at a corner so-
lution, where each of the players supplies nothing of one of the public goods,
free-riding on the expenditure made by the other. In this type of equilibrium,
a small transfer between the players does a⁄ect the equilibrium, increasing or
decreasing the supply of a public good according to whether the transfer is away
from or towards the free rider for that good.
The ￿nal step therefore is to argue that households are characterized by a
division of responsibilities based on "socially recognised and sanctioned gender
roles", under which each partner specialises in buying just one of the public
goods, so we necessarily have the corner solution case in the non-cooperative
equilibrium. In this equilibrium, assuming partner i = 1;2 buys only the one
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where x￿
j is the equilibrium supply of the other￿ s public good, and pi is the price
of xi. Note that in this non-cooperative game there is no income pooling: the
partners are constrained in their choices by their own incomes. Then the threat
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In general, each threat point is a function of both partners￿wage rates and
non-wage incomes, since the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium values x￿
i;l￿
i are
determined by all these variables. The cooperative Nash bargaining solution is
then found by solving
max
xili






(wili + pixi) ￿
X
i
(wi + ￿i) (25)
Thus changes in either one of the ￿i a⁄ect both the threat points by changing
the Nash equilibrium of the non-cooperative game, and anonymity will not hold,
even though the budget constraint in the cooperative game assumes pooling.
Note that the solution of the Nash bargaining game is Pareto e¢ cient, since
the GHWF NS possesses the Pareto property, and unrestricted transfers are
permitted by the pooled budget constraint. On the other hand, the threat
points are not Pareto e¢ cient, because in that equilibrium each partner takes
no account of the utility the other derives from his or her supply of the public
good when choosing how much of that good to buy.
The exclusion of household production in this model makes it necessary to
insist on a corner solution for the non-cooperative equilibrium, and this implies
23assigning a very powerful role to "socially recognised and sanctioned gender
roles". Can these however really be so powerful that an individual cannot buy
both of the public goods on the market, for example increasing his or her con-
sumption of the other￿ s public good if not enough of it is being provided in
the non-cooperative equilibrium? This of course undoes the model, since in
equilibrium both contributions to each public good will be positive. Examples
of gender specialisation in household provision that come to mind, for example
with females supplying child care and males house maintenance, relate to spe-
cialisation in household production activities rather than expenditures. Even
here it is hard to believe that only complete specialisation is feasible or permis-
sible.
Konrad and Lommerud (1995) show in fact that the required non-neutrality
of pure transfers between the individuals in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
can be far more plausibly rationalised in a model where individuals di⁄er in their
productivities in household production, so that specialisation is based on com-
parative advantage rather than socially sanctioned gender roles.48 Thus they
show that it is not necessary to have a corner solution in the non-cooperative
game in order to obtain non-anonymity with respect to transfers.
Furthermore, it is of course possible that one of the spouses supplies no
time to the labour market, which after all is the case in a large proportion
of households. In that case, the non-cooperative equilibrium in the separate
spheres model involves a zero supply of her public good (absent non-wage in-
come) which strengthens the argument against a corner solution in this equi-
librium. Moreover, in the ￿nal Nash bargaining equilibrium she can only buy
this public good with a transfer from her spouse. As with all household models
that ignore household production, the role of a spouse who supplies no market
labour is essentially parasitic. Thus, although we agree that non-cooperation
rather than divorce on the whole provides a more plausible rationalisation of
threat points, and succeeds in extending the scope of the non-anonymity result,
the model certainly gains in plausibility from being based on separate spheres
in household production rather than simply in expenditures.
The model of Nash bargaining with non-cooperative Nash equilibrium threat
points in Chen and Woolley (2001) does not make the separate spheres assump-
tion, and allows the possibility that both partners buy positive amounts of the
public good in the threat point equilibrium. However, in this model the overall
Nash equilibrium solution is still always sensitive to the non-wage incomes49 of
the partners, essentially because the bargaining is assumed to be over transfers
of income, rather than over the allocations of expenditures to private and public
consumption goods. The partners take their Nash bargained equilibrium income
shares and then individually maximise their own utility in choosing their own
consumption and the amount of the household public good they buy. In terms
of Samuelson￿ s Theorem, bargaining is over the sharing rule. The result of this
is that, although their Nash bargaining GHWF possesses the Pareto property,
48Though of course the reasons for these di⁄erences in productivities might be related to
conventional modes of upbringing.
49There is no labour supply in their model, all income is in any case exogenous.
24the ￿nal household consumption allocation is not Pareto e¢ cient, and this is
perhaps the most striking result of the model. The reason is that in spend-
ing their incomes individually rationally, they choose their expenditures on the
household public good non-cooperatively.
The question then of course arises: why do the partners not perceive that
they could both be better o⁄ if they bargained directly over expenditure allo-
cations, rather than subjecting themselves to the two-stage process of a coop-
erative income allocation and then a non-cooperative expenditure allocation?
Second best allocations always arise out of some additional constraint on the
￿rst best allocation process. In this case, this is the constraint that bargain-
ing must be over income shares and not consumption choices. It is hard to see
however why rational households would subject themselves to such a constraint,
when it leads to Pareto-inferior outcomes. They are after all free to choose what
they bargain about.
In conclusion: Bargaining models impose a very speci￿c and not especially
convenient structure on the GHWF. Amongst the proponents of the approach,
there seems to be no consensus on a satisfactory speci￿cation of the threat
points, while the results of the models are sensitive to these. Moreover, the
"ethical basis" for Nash bargaining, de￿ned by its four axioms - the Pareto
property, invariance to positive linear transformations of the utility functions,
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and symmetry50 - are not as a group
particularly compelling as a representation of family decision taking, however
intuitively appealing the idea is that some kind of explicit or implicit negotiation
takes place within households. For example, there is no place for interpersonal
utility comparisons in Nash bargaining, yet casual observation suggests that
these are extremely prevalent in families. The requirement that just two indi-
viduals determine the household allocation is restrictive, and no justi￿cation is
given for assuming that the bargaining game is cooperative, i.e. that binding
commitments are possible. We believe that these quali￿cations leave a lot of
room for alternative approaches to the formal modelling of household decision
taking. In the rest of this paper we discuss some of these alternatives.
2.4.3 The collective model
The history of the collective model begins with something of a puzzle. In intro-
ducing the model, Chiappori (1988) makes the apparently unequivocal claim:
[I]t tries to derive falsi￿able conditions upon household behav-
ior from a "collective rationality" concept; however, instead of re-
ferring to some de￿nite bargaining concept, it only makes a very
weak and general assumption - namely that the household always
reaches Pareto-e¢ cient agreements. The question which is investi-
gated through the paper is thus the following: does Pareto e¢ ciency
50This says that in a symmetric game both players should receive the same utilities in the
bargaining solution. A game is symmetric if in the (u1;u2)-coordinate plane the feasible set
of utility pairs is symmetric about the 450 line and the threat point utilities lie on this line.
25alone imply restrictions upon observable household behavior?
and similarly, Chiappori (1992) states
Indeed, it is only assumed that agents are either egoistic or "car-
ing" in the Beckerian sense and that internal decision processes are
cooperative, in the sense that they systematically lead to Pareto-
e¢ cient outcomes.
Now it is straightforward to characterize a given household equilibrium al-
location by Pareto e¢ ciency conditions alone, and, by the Second Theorem
of Welfare Economics, to interpret this as being generated as if the household
￿rst shared its aggregate income among its members, who then maximise their
individual utilities. However, the ￿rst point made by Samuelson (1956) was pre-
cisely to insist that Pareto e¢ ciency alone is not enough to enable restrictions
to be placed on the results of a comparative statics analysis of this equilib-
rium. Simply knowing that, following some change in prices or income, the new
equilibrium is Pareto e¢ cient, does not allow us to say where this will be in
the Pareto e¢ cient set, in relation to the previous equilibrium. Restrictions
on demand functions expressing the results of this comparative statics analysis
therefore cannot be derived from Pareto e¢ ciency alone.
The puzzle is resolved later on in Chiappori (1988) and (1992), where it
becomes clear that he is actually assuming the existence of a household sharing
rule or, equivalently, of some GHWF. This becomes most explicit in Browning
and Chiappori (1998), where the "household utility function" or, in the present
terminology, the GHWF, is explicitly written51 as
HC = ￿(w1;w2;￿)u1(x1;l1) + [1 ￿ ￿(w1;w2;￿)]u2(x2;l2) (26)
Thus the collective model is characterised by a weighted utilitarian household
welfare function, the weights varying with the wage rates and total household
income. The phrase "assuming Pareto e¢ ciency alone" can be interpreted as
being intended to emphasise that the model does not adopt a speci￿c Nash
bargaining formulation, but abstracts, in the spirit of Samuelson, from explicit
consideration of the process by which the household agreement is reached. It
cannot mean however that no HWF is being assumed.
The well-known property of a weighted utilitarian SWF is that it possesses
no inequality aversion: all utility pairs that yield the same total are equally good.
The fact that the model developed as a reaction against Nash bargaining may
explain why the choice of a GHWF with zero inequality aversion is not discussed
in the literature on the collective model, even though it implies a substantive
51In the notation of the model we are presently using. In Chiappori (1988) and (1992)
the subject of the analysis was labour supplies, and so the GHWF would be written as here.
In Browning and Chiappori (1998) the analysis was of consumption expenditures and the
function is written as: ￿(p;￿)u1(x1;x2;X) + [1 ￿ ￿(p;￿)]u2(x1;x2;X) where p is a price
vector, xi are consumption vectors and X is a household public good.
26restriction on the distributional preferences of the household.52 It follows the
Nash bargaining models in generalising the HWF to contain as arguments prices
and income, and possibly also EEP￿ s, though it does not distinguish between
the individual non-wage incomes.53
A central issue raised in Chiappori (1988) and (1992) is that of whether
the household￿ s sharing rule si(w1;w2;￿) can be identi￿ed by using empirical
labour supply functions of individual household members, estimated on typically
available datasets. The general answer is that it cannot, but there are special
cases in which its partial derivatives can be derived from estimated labour supply
functions. Thus in Chiappori (1988) and (1992) the household consists only of
two individuals, each of whom supplies labour to the market, and there is no
household production. Chiappori shows that in this model it is possible to
identify the partial derivatives of the sharing rule, essentially because the only
way in which the household non-wage income and the other partner￿ s wage
rate enter the labour supply function of each individual is through this sharing
rule. Estimates of the coe¢ cients of the partner￿ s wage and of household non-
wage income from empirical labour supply functions then provide the basis
for identi￿cation of the partial derivatives of the sharing rule. Necessary for
this identi￿cation however is that we have as many labour supply functions
as individuals with shares in the household income. If there are non-working
children, or if one of the adults supplies no labour to the market, there are not
enough parameter estimates and the model is underidenti￿ed.
Chiappori (1992) places some emphasis on the importance of identi￿cation
of the partial derivatives of the sharing rule for the analysis of public policy,
for example income taxation. In any optimal tax or tax reform analysis based
on a household model, the derivatives of individual income shares with respect
to net of tax wage rates appear prominently in the conditions determining tax
rates.54 However, knowledge of these derivatives alone is not in general su¢ cient
to allow solution of the conditions for the tax rates. Knowing by how much
an individual￿ s income share would change does not help us to decide on the
desirability of such a change in the absence of information about the levels of
the income shares. Marginal social utilities of income depend on levels of income
as well as the income share derivatives. For example, the fact that 55 cents of a
one dollar increase in income would ￿ ow to 1 and 45 cents to 2 cannot be judged
to be a good or bad thing unless we know how well o⁄ relative to each other 1
and 2 are in the ￿rst place. Moreover, if, because of data limitations, it really
is the case that only aggregate household non-wage income is observable, while
income shares are functions of individual non-wage incomes, then we have no
way of retrieving the derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to individual
52In the social choice literature of course, there is extensive discussion of the arguments for
and against utilitarianism as a basis for the social welfare function.
53Strictly speaking therefore, the model does not make any predictions about anonymity
with respect to individual non-wage income changes, since it does not identify these. Chiappori
(1988) explains the choice of total non-wage income on the grounds that typical datasets do
not provide information on individual non-wage incomes.
54See for example Apps and Rees (1988).
27non-wage incomes.
However, as Apps and Rees (1997) show, and Chiappori (1997) acknowl-
edges, the major limitation to the applicability of the result arises out of the
fact that the model excludes household production. In the presence of house-
hold production, it is no longer su¢ cient to have empirical estimates of the
labour supply functions, since these do not yield the leisure demand functions.
Non-market time is divided between household production and leisure. It is
therefore also necessary to have estimates of the individual demand functions
for time spent in household production, together with data on domestic output.
Even when these are available, further restrictions are required in order to iden-
tify the derivatives of the sharing rule along the lines suggested by Chiappori.
One possibility is to assume constant returns to scale in household production.
Apps and Rees show that this assumption is necessary to reduce the number
of unknown partial derivatives to equal the number of equations assumed to be
empirically estimated.55
When data on domestic output are missing, an alternative assumption that
has the e⁄ect of constructing the missing data is necessary. One possibility
is the assumption that household goods have perfect market substitutes, as in
the farm household production model mentioned earlier (though note that in
the empirical work on this model farm output data are also collected). In this
case the price of the good produced by the household is exogenously given and
observable. Chiappori shows that in this case his earlier results on retrievability
continue to hold.
In the more general case where the household goods do not have perfect mar-
ket substitutes and output data are unavailable, even with the constant returns
to scale assumption the sharing rule can be identi￿ed only up to an additive
function of wages, i.e. not even its partial derivatives can be identi￿ed, as con-
￿rmed by Chiappori. The problem is that in this case the implicit (endogenous)
price of the domestic good is identi￿ed only up to a multiplicative constant. In
other words it could be anything (positive). This supports our basic contention:
Empirical applications of the sharing rule approach simply have to have more
comprehensive datasets.
3 Non-cooperative Models
The distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative games hinges on the
ability to make binding commitments to implement an agreed set of actions.
Thus in Nash bargaining, the parties can somehow commit themselves to im-
plement whatever actions produce the utility pair given by the Nash bargaining
solution. This possibility of making binding commitments, for example in the
55This is shown in Proposition 4 of Apps and Rees (1997) and Proposition 2 of Chiappori
(1997). Somewhat puzzlingly, Chiappori claims that the latter ￿generalises proposition 4 in
Apps and Rees since we do not need to assume that the production function is linear.￿(p.199).
This must be based on a misreading, because Proposition 4 in Apps and Rees clearly states
that the condition is linear homogeneity of the production function.
28form of legally enforceable contracts, is exogenously given. In non-cooperative
games no such exogenously given commitment possibilities exist, and although
equilibria that are "cooperative", in the sense of being Pareto e¢ cient, may be
possible, they must be supported by the self interest of the players, and so their
existence is endogenous to the game being played.
It seems clear that, descriptively speaking, household decision taking is bet-
ter characterised as non-cooperative in this sense. There may be formal laws,
social norms and customs that constrain individual actions within the house-
hold, but it seems fanciful to suggest that these amount to a mechanism for
making complete, binding commitments. There are three possible responses to
this observation.
The ￿rst is to try to rescue the Nash bargaining approach by appealing
to some results in the theory of non-cooperative bargaining games.56 Thus as
Binmore et al (1986) show, in an in￿nitely repeated non-cooperative bargaining
game where two players alternately make o⁄ers at ￿xed intervals of time, as the
length of this time interval goes to zero, the solution of the game converges to
that of the corresponding cooperative Nash bargaining game. Though this is a
beautiful result, it does not in our view provide a realistic basis for adopting
the cooperative bargaining approach to household decision taking.
The second response is to take the non-cooperative approach seriously and
to model household decision taking as a game in which the solution concept is
Nash equilibrium or some re￿nement of it. Here there are two approaches in
the literature. One, already discussed in the previous section, is to draw on
the theory of voluntary-contribution public goods games, modelling household
consumption as a public good. The main general limitation of this is that it
gives too prominent a place to household public goods in the household￿ s con-
sumption decisions. The second approach, which is designed for the analysis
of labour supply decisions, is to derive best-response or reaction functions in
these variables and solve for the Nash equilibrium. This approach was intro-
duced by Leuthold (1968), and further developed by Ashworth and Ulph (1981),
though neither paper points out explicitly that it is ￿nding a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium of the household. A comprehensive and insightful discussion
of both the theory and econometrics of these kinds of models is provided by
Kapteyn and Kooreman (1990).
Leuthold takes a household consisting of two individuals with utilities de-
￿ned only on total household consumption of a market good and own leisure
consumption, and with a pooled budget constraint. Each independently max-
imises his/her own utility function, assumed to have the Stone-Geary form, sub-
ject to this budget constraint, but with the labour supply of the other, which
enters into this constraint via the wage income variable, taken as given. This
is how the strategic interdependence between the players in this game comes
about. The relationships that emerge from this maximisation are the individ-
56The proponents of the Nash bargaining models discussed above saw no reason for such a
justi￿cation. They took the ability to commit simply as given, and saw the bargaining ap-
proach as appropriately capturing the elements of con￿ict as well as cooperation in household
decision taking.
29ual reaction functions. The household equilbrium is then found by solving the
simultaneous equations de￿ned by these functions, giving the Nash equilibrium.
This solution is then the basis for the comparative statics analysis of the model
and its empirical estimation.
Ashworth and Ulph allow utilities to depend also on the partner￿ s leisure
consumption, the case of "caring preferences", and adopt a ￿ exible functional
form for the utility function, but given the data that are available in the typical
datasets, including theirs, the cases of "sel￿sh" and "caring" preferences are
observationally equivalent. They explicitly test and reject the hypothesis that
the parameters of the two utility functions are identical, which they interpret
as being equivalent to rejection of the model that treats the household as if it
were a single consumer. Neither paper explores the question of the allocation
of total consumption between the two individuals.
Kapteyn and Kooreman argue that an important and questionable aspect of
this Nash equilibrium solution is that it is not Pareto e¢ cient. Each individual
could be made strictly better o⁄ by moving from this equilibrium to a point on
the Pareto frontier, but such a move cannot be supported as an equilibrium in
this one-shot non-cooperative game. Thus Kapteyn and Kooreman follow Ulph
(1988) and Woolley (1988) in suggesting the equilibrium as the basis for threat
points or reservation values, though whereas the latter two would embed them
in a Nash bargaining game, Kapteyn and Kooreman impose them as constraints
on the problem of maximising a Samuelsonian HWF. The di⁄erence between the
two approaches is that whereas proposing Nash bargaining implies assuming a
speci￿c cooperative game without a justi￿cation for the possibility of binding
agreements, Samuelson￿ s approach leaves the process by which the HWF is
derived entirely open. Kapteyn and Kooreman go on to show that, given the
datasets typically available for estimation of these types of models, they will
in general be under-identi￿ed, and illustrate with a speci￿c example how more
data can improve identi￿cation.
The third and most satisfactory response to the observation that household
members are engaged in a non-cooperative game is to recognise that this is in
fact a repeated game, rather than the one-shot game that has been modelled in
the literature discussed so far. This opens up the possibility of application of
a rich body of game-theoretic literature, which so far seems only to have been
exploited by Lundberg and Pollak (1994), and Basu(2006).
The intuitive idea that rational households ought to be able to do better
than the one-shot non-cooperative Nash equilibrium receives support in the
theory of repeated non-cooperative games, where it is shown how "cooperative",
i.e. Pareto e¢ cient, equilibria can be supported by threats of punishment for
deviation from them by any individual player. In a sense, this could be thought
of as the generalisation of the idea of a threat point. Since a potential deviant
will weigh up the cost of future punishment against the immediate gain from
deviation, the future must not be too heavily discounted for such threats to
work, which we will assume to be the case in the following discussion. The
simplest form of punishment following deviation from the agreed equilibrium
would be reversion to the one-shot non-cooperative equilbrium for the rest of
30the game,57 but more sophisticated "carrot and stick" strategies58, in which
punishments harsher than Nash reversion are imposed for a limited period,
followed by return to the cooperative equilbrium, can support Pareto e¢ cient
outcomes as subgame perfect equilibria.
There are three important conceptual issues in the analysis of such games,
each of which is relevant to the application of these ideas to the economics of the
household. First is the issue of the ￿niteness of the repeated game. Since the
lives of household members are ￿nite, attempting to apply the theory developed
for in￿nitely repeated games to the household runs into the paradox of backward
induction. In the last period of the game there is no possibility of supporting
cooperative behaviour by the threat of future punishment for a deviation, and
so the only equilibrium is the one-shot Nash equilibrium. In the second-to-last
period, everyone knows the equilibrium that will be played in the last period
and so no threat can support cooperation in this period - again only the one-
shot Nash equilibrium can be sustained. This argument can then be applied
period-by-period right back to the ￿rst. Thus "cooperative" equilibria are not
possible.
There are however a number of cases in which this problem can be circum-
vented. One important case is that in which there is uncertainty about the
terminal period of the game: for almost all periods, there is some probability
that there will be a future period. Then, cooperation may still be sustained
by the threat of punishment in a possible future. Also important is the case
in which there is some probability that any given household member is simply
of the cooperative type,59 because, say, she has internalised social and cultural
norms that would make one play the game cooperatively rather than sel￿shly
(individually rationally). If all players are of this type then there is no prob-
lem, but even if one is not, she may ￿nd it individually rational to behave for
at least part of the game as if she were, in order to maintain a reputation for
being a cooperative type. In both these types of games, we would expect to
see the breakdown of cooperative behaviour in the later stages of the game. A
third example is the case in which there are multiple Nash equilibria in the one-
shot game, which seems perfectly possible for household models in general.60
Then the backward induction chain could be broken, for example by support-
ing cooperation in the next-to-last period by the threat of playing the worst
possible Nash equilibrium instead of the best possible Nash equilibrium in the
last period. This would work if the discounted value of the di⁄erence in payo⁄s
between the two equilibria exceeds the immediate gain from deviation.
The second issue concerns renegotiation proofness.61 Punishment for devia-
57See Friedman (1977) who has extensively analysed such strategies. Note that these games,
known as supergames, take the form of in￿nitely repeated plays of the same one-shot game.
58See Abreu (1986).
59For analysis of such games see Kreps et al (1982).
60Though models using non-cooperative equilibria, such as Chen and Woolley (2001),
Leuthold (1968), and Lundberg and Pollak (1993) usually exclude this possibility by using
speci￿c functional forms for the utility functions. For the game theory in this case see Benoit
and Krishna (1985).
61See for example Farrell and Maskin (1989).
31tion could be costly to the punisher, and, given that a deviation has occurred,
it might appear rational to "kiss and make up", "forgive and forget", and not
carry out the self-lacerating punishment. But anticipation of this ex ante would
then make the cooperative solution unsustainable.Thus attention would have to
be restricted to cooperative equilibria that can be supported by punishments
that would credibly be carried out, for example because they give the punisher,
for the duration of the punishment, a higher payo⁄ than she obtains at the
cooperative equilibrium that is to be supported.
The third issue concerns completeness of information. Informaton in a game
is complete if each player knows at each point in time the actions chosen by all
players at all previous points in time. Suppose however that the previous choice
of action by the other players is not observable by any one player, and, because
of some kind of underlying uncertainty, cannot be inferred from the outcomes
of the game.62 When a particular set of payo⁄s is realised, there is a positive
probability that it was generated by actions that deviated from the cooperative
agreement. The optimal punishment strategies in this case take the form of
setting a critical level of payo⁄ and carrying out the punishment if the actual
payo⁄ deviates from this, where this critical level re￿ ects a choice of probability
that it was not due to chance.
As a simple example: suppose that if he studies appropriately hard for a
math exam, your son should obtain an A with probability 0.5, a B with prob-
ability 0.4, and a C with probability 0.1. You cannot observe how hard he
studies, so promise him a ticket to the next game of his favourite football team
if he gets an A, nothing if he gets a B, and that he￿ s grounded for a week and
has to work on his math if he gets a C. You know that if you do this, he will
certainly study hard. The slightly paradoxical thing about this is that if he does
get a C, you have to carry out the punishment, even though you know that he
was simply unlucky and did work hard. If you take him to the football game
anyway, since you yourself get pleasure from doing that, he has no incentive to
work hard in future, and if he anticipates your doing this, he has no incentive
to study hard now.
The theory of ￿nitely-repeated non-cooperative games o⁄ers a rich set of
ideas for application to the economics of the household. It suggests that under
some circumstances a household may achieve Pareto e¢ cient outcomes, though
this cannot be taken for granted, and in some contexts it may be interesting
and important to analyse this explicitly within the framework of a properly
formulated non-cooperative game. We pursue this point in the next section.
Finally, it should be noted that typically, the set of equilibria that may be
supported by threat strategies in a repeated game can be quite large, so that
there is still a problem of equilibrium selection. One proposal might be that the
equilibrium could be selected by Nash bargaining over the set of utility pairs
sustainable as equilibria by threats of punishment for deviation, but for reasons
given in the previous section we regard this as too special and constricting.
62For analysis of models of this type in the context of oligopoly see Abreu, Pearce and
Stacchetti (1986), Green and Porter (1984), Rees (1985) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).
32Lundberg and Pollak (1994) see this multiplicity as allowing a role to be played
by social and cultural norms, custom and tradition. An obvious way to formalise
this is by the GHWF. We can explore the implications of any speci￿c set of
assumptions about these norms and customs, as well as those holding for all
sets of assumptions that result in a GHWF with the properties set out earler,
by maximising this over a set of utility possibilities that can be regarded as
supportable as equilibria in an appropriately-formulated ￿nitely-repeated non-
cooperative game. We now turn to an example of the application of this idea.
4 The Pareto property and Pareto (in)e¢ ciency
Cooperative household models see the household as acting as if it maximises a
GHWF. The Pareto property, that the GHWF is strictly increasing in the util-
ities of its members, is one of the general properties of this function. Whether
the household actually achieves a ￿rst best Pareto e¢ cient allocation is a sepa-
rate issue, and in this section we illustrate this point with a cooperative model
which has a Pareto ine¢ cient equilibrium.
This ine¢ ciency arises because we assume that the household members are
unable to make binding commitments over time, although within any given
time period they are able to do so. The model tries to capture the following
situation. A newly-formed household sees its future in two phases. In the ￿rst,
it will have a high demand for household production. If one of the partners
specialises in this, as is usually the case, she will reduce her market labour
supply and correspondingly accumulate less work-related human capital. In the
second phase, there is a much lower demand for household production, but the
partner who previously specialised in it will face a lower market wage rate. If the
couple can commit in the ￿rst period to consumption levels in the second, they
can achieve a Pareto e¢ cient allocation which takes into account that their joint
income will be lower in the second period the more household production they
have in the ￿rst. The weight each receives in the GHWF is determined by their
wage rates in the ￿rst period, because that is when they negotiate the allocation.
However, if they cannot make a binding commitment to consumption levels in
the second phase, they must recognise that any ￿rst period agreement would be
renegotiated at that time in the light of the then-prevailing wage rates. Thus,
we have to impose as an additional constraint on their choice of allocations in
the ￿rst period, the restriction on the possible allocations they will be able to
negotiate in the second. This creates the second best Pareto ine¢ ciency.
We take a two-period model in which only one partner, f; carries out house-
hold production, in the ￿rst period only. The key assumption is that, because
human capital acquisition is work-related, her market wage in the second period
is a decreasing function of the amount of household production she carries out
in the ￿rst period, since this displaces time spent in market work in that period.
We model the household￿ s choices ￿rst on the assumption that it is able to com-
mit in the ￿rst period to individual consumption levels in the second, and show
that we obtain a Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium. We then show the ine¢ ciency
33that results when commitment is not possible.63
The Commitment Case
Assume that m supplies 1 unit of market labour inelastically and that his
wage is constant over time at wm; while f￿ s wage is wf1 in period 1 and wf2 =
!(y); in period 2, with !0(y) < 0: Production of the household good y is carried
out in the ￿rst period only. We assume that one unit of f￿ s time produces one
unit of y; and so the marginal opportunity cost or implicit price of y is wf1:When
the household can commit to future consumption values, it solves the problem




(xi1 + wf1yi) ￿ wm + wf1 (28)
X
i
xi2 ￿ wm + !(y) (29)
where x is a market consumption good with price normalised at 1 and
P
i yi = y:
We assume time-separable utility with no utility discounting. To concentrate
on essentials, we also assume no capital market. Since the household chooses
its allocation at time 1, the relevant argument in the GHWF, which determines
the marginal weight f￿ s utility receives, is her ￿rst period wage wf1: Then the
￿rst order conditions with respect to consumptions can be written as:
@uf1=@yf
@uf1=@xf1















implying of course Pareto e¢ ciency. Here ￿ = ￿2=￿1 is a discount factor, where
￿1 and ￿2 are the marginal utilities of income in periods 1 and 2 respectively.
The household takes full account of the fact that part of the cost of household
production in the ￿rst period is a lower wage for f in the second, arising from
the loss of her human capital, and so expresses the implicit relative price of the
domestic good in period 1 as wf1 ￿ ￿!0 (recall !0(y) < 0): The term ￿￿!0 acts
as a tax on current consumption of the domestic good. It arises because the
household￿ s income in period 2 will be lower, the higher is f￿ s domestic output
in period 1.
63This type of problem has been thoroughly analysed in general terms in the "transactions
cost" literature, associated primarily with Coase, Grossman, Hart and Williamson. See Hart
(1995) and Williamson (1989) for comprehensive accounts of this literature. The problem
arises because complete contracts cannot be written or enforced. Marriage seems a partic-
ularly striking case of an incomplete contract. Pollak (1985) appears to have been the ￿rst
to introduce the ideas from this literature into household economics. The model in Apps
(1981), (1982) has the idea of market productivity decreasing with specialisation in household
production. The present model is a simpler version of a Nash bargaining formulation of the
non-commitment problem developed by Ott (1992) ch. 6. See also Lundberg and Pollak
(2003) for a similar type of Pareto ine¢ ciency. The simplicity of the present model is perhaps
an argument for the GHWF approach.
34The Non-Commitment Case
The model is as before, but now both partners realise that any prior agree-
ment on consumptions in period 2 will be renegotiated in the light of wage rates
prevailing at that time. Then the time 2 allocation will be chosen as the solution





xi2 ￿ wm + !(y) (33)
That is, the weight given to f in the second period will re￿ ect her wage in
that period. It follows that the optimal solutions to this problem are functions
x￿
i2[!(y)]: Moreover, given the assumptions on the GHWF set out in Section









as we would expect. A change in y changes each period 2 consumption not
only because of an income e⁄ect, but also because the relative weights on the
individuals￿utilities change in m￿ s favour.








(xi1 + wf1yi) ￿ wm + wf1 (36)









i = f;m (37)
Then, since the second terms on the right hand side are unequal for each i; the
￿rst period allocation will not be Pareto e¢ cient. In choosing their consump-
tions, they take into account the e⁄ects of f0s loss of human capital on their
individual consumptions and utilities in the household equilibrium in period
2 and, since these are di⁄erent, their marginal rates of substitution between
the two goods in period 1 will di⁄er. They cannot correct this because of the
inability to make binding commitments to the allocation in period 2.
5 Conclusions
One aim of this paper has been to suggest that the literature￿ s neglect of Samuel-
son￿ s proposal that cooperative households can be modelled as if they maximised
a form of social welfare function, the household welfare function, was a mistake.
McElroy and Horney￿ s criticism of the implications of the standard kind of
35HWF, de￿ned only on utilities of household members, was however well-taken,
and the idea which follows directly from their Nash bargaining model, that the
household￿ s preference ordering over the utility pro￿les of its members depends
on exogenous variables, in particular wage rates and non-wage incomes, is an
important and fruitful one. It has however much wider application than to bar-
gaining models alone, and can be made the basis for a general approach to mod-
elling household decision taking, ￿ exible enough to encompass non-cooperative
behaviour and Pareto ine¢ ciencies arising out of the inevitable incompleteness
and unenforceability of domestic agreements. We have also tried to point out
some of the implications for existing models of the neglect of household produc-
tion. Above all, the aim has been to provide a deeper understanding of the
current theoretical literature on household economics by means of a survey of
its history.
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